During Donald Trump‘s first presidency in the United States, Lubomír Metnar served as the Czech Republic‘s Minister of Defense. He welcomed Trump‘s recent election as a promise of “stability and calm, which the world now desperately needs.”
What informs this view of yours after Trump‘s first four years as president? Those weren‘t exactly stable or calm years.
First, let me clarify that I mentioned stability and calm because of the expectations surrounding Donald Trump being elected. I anticipate that he will follow through on his promise to address the armed conflict in Ukraine. My expectations are also shaped by his previous term, during which he, albeit unexpectedly, orchestrated the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, ending a conflict that lasted over two decades. Looking back at his presidency, when Trump succeeded Barack Obama, only five NATO countries were meeting the two-percent-of-GDP defense spending commitment. By the end of his term in January 2021, this figure had risen to eleven. This indicates that his appeals to NATO countries were effective. I expect Trump will continue to press for European nations to take greater responsibility for their security and defense capabilities and contribute more to NATO.
How challenging will it be to increase defense spending beyond the currently promised two percent of GDP? Does the army have enough to spend the funds on?
Let me start with the latter part of your question. The Czech Army certainly has plenty of ways to use allocated financial resources, given its outdated equipment – some of it of Soviet origin. However, the preparation of projects at the ministry has faltered during this electoral term, hindering the ability to utilize these funds effectively. For instance, when the ANO government ended its term in 2021, defense spending was at 1.39 percent of GDP. This dropped to 1.34 percent in 2022 and 1.37 percent in 2023. I don‘t expect better results this year – quite the contrary. The causes of these issues include poor planning, unclear priorities, and delays in already planned projects, some of which have been pushed to 2035 under the Czech Army‘s Development Concept. Additionally, the ministry has been overly focused on large international projects that fail to significantly involve domestic industry. As evident from the ministry‘s current results, it is neither prepared nor capable of responding to such a sudden budget increase. Moreover, the defense budget for 2025 exemplifies this lack of preparedness, as funds are being diverted from projects to cover increased advance payments for F-35 aircraft – CZK 8.5 billion in 2025 and another CZK 4 billion in 2026. These funds would be better used for essential projects like strengthening air defense with ground-based systems to protect airspace, which is crucial according to lessons learned from current conflicts. During ANO‘s time in government, we supported a gradual increase toward meeting the two-percent commitment. In contrast, the current government made a populist promise to meet this goal by 2024, then postponed it to 2025 without understanding the realities of planning and project readiness. Petr Fiala‘s government has utterly underestimated the essential process of acquisition planning. As a result of the sudden budget increase and the populist promise, the ministry has been unable to allocate and utilize these financial resources. Moreover, as already mentioned, it has postponed the implementation of planned strategic projects to 2035. The government‘s unsystematic approach is evident in the purchase of F-35 aircraft, which were neither requested nor included in the army‘s development plans, as well as in the acquisition of medium-sized Embraer transport aircraft.
Should the Czech Republic have a larger and better-equipped army than it already does? Should professional soldiers earn top-tier salaries of CZK 50,000-100,000 per month?
Since 2005, the Czech Republic has had a professional army. In recent years, efforts have been made to ensure these soldiers are well-trained, equipped, and armed with modern weapons and technology – a protracted process after years of massive budget cuts. Regarding troop numbers, government-approved strategic documents set a target of 30,000 professional soldiers and 10,000 active reservists by 2030. Achieving these numbers requires making military service competitive in the job market, particularly for lower ranks, which make up the foundation of the army and where competitiveness is currently lacking. To address this, I am proposing that next year we reallocate defense funds from F-35 payments to increase salaries for professional soldiers by an additional five percent on top of the planned increase.
Recruiting for active reserves is even more problematic than regular army recruitment. Why is interest in active reserves so low?
You‘re right – this is a frequent observation. While the Ministry of Defense claims to be streamlining reserve recruitment, it‘s clear this effort hasn‘t been effective. The system remains overly bureaucratic, and potential recruits often perceive a lack of effort by officials to improve the process.
From an expert perspective, what is your view on the development of the war in Ukraine? Should it end quickly to prevent Ukraine‘s collapse? Is Russia on the brink of collapse as well, but masking it better?
I believe the conflict in Ukraine must be resolved first through a military ceasefire. Russia, though advancing slowly, continues to capture Ukrainian territory and devastate critical infrastructure with unprecedented attacks. This destruction, alongside the human cost, underscores the urgency of ending the conflict and pursuing a diplomatic resolution. Western countries must support Ukraine in this effort, but Ukraine itself must set the terms for any potential ceasefire.
The author is a European editor of Deník
ELECTION
According to polls, ANO 2011 is on track to win next year‘s election. Will Lubomír Metnar aim to return as Minister of Defense? „Personally, I hope ANO achieves the best possible result in the next election,“ he says, adding, „As for my potential role, I won‘t speculate. Let‘s wait for the election results and post-election coalition negotiations. Only then can this question be answered seriously.“
CV BOX
Lubomír Metnar (born October 6, 1967, in Olomouc) is a non- partisan member of parliament for ANO 2011 and a former minister of defense.
After graduating from secondary school, he worked for the communist national police before studying economics, trade, and services at the University of Ostrava from 1994 to 1998. He later served as a police investigator in the Moravian-Silesian Region and briefly headed security for the Vítkovice machine works. From 2013, he served as deputy minister of interior for a year before returning to the private sector.
In December 2017, he was appointed minister of interior, transitioning in June 2018 to serve as minister of defense until December 2021. Since the 2021 election, he has been a non-partisan member of parliament for ANO 2011. He is the chair of the Defense Committee.
