Jaromír Zůna began his military career in 1984 as a platoon commander. In mid-December 2025, he was appointed minister of defence and also serves as deputy prime minister. Taking on this role was made easier by his deep familiarity with the military environment, gained during his previous years in senior positions at the General Staff.
How have you settled into your role at the Ministry of Defence, in the building beneath Prague Castle, and how have you adapted to your subordinates?
It felt as though I had only left yesterday. I simply stepped into the process and got to work. Just three days after taking office, I was already convening the minister’s board and approving billion-crown contracts. The first document I requested was a directive on organizational and mobilization changes, which immediately gave me an overview of structural developments within the ministry. When I attended my first meeting with the leadership, there was not a single person I did not already know from the past. Essentially, they were all individuals appointed during the tenure of Minister Luboš Metnar. And I could go on. This is not typical for incoming ministers of defence. Naturally, I do not consider myself a political outsider in this role, but a professional from within the field, and that is why many processes already have strong momentum.
But that also sparked mixed reactions and debates, didn’t it?
Yes, but I am only interested in them if they bring forward stronger ideas, concepts, or theoretical solutions than those I already have. In my very first week, I outlined several fundamental principles for the direction of the ministry, and regardless of what anyone thought, all of them proved effective. Since my service with the U.S. Army in 2001, I have focused on force development and have compiled around forty thousand entries in my databases over the years. These were not developed by me alone, but also by many highly talented colleagues I had the opportunity to work with. I am now gradually implementing them and have no intention of stepping back. I believe it is in the interest of our country to fulfill the goal set in 2002 – to build a professional, modern, technologically advanced, and well-managed army staffed by competent and motivated personnel. I will not abandon that objective because of superficial debates about percentages.
You studied international relations and European studies. How do you perceive current global relations?
Over the course of my career, I attended a number of prestigious institutions at home and abroad and had the privilege of learning from exceptional teachers, including internationally recognized political scientists and statesmen. However, I felt that the knowledge and experience I had gained lacked a clear structure and theoretical grounding, which is why I pursued international studies. As for the current nature of international relations, they are evolving more or less as long anticipated. To illustrate, let us go back more than two decades. In the early 1990s, at military expert forums, we were already presented with scenarios suggesting that although the Cold War had ended, we were entering an era of continuous security crises that would inevitably affect Europe. During a deployment to Hawaii in 2002, I learned that countries in the Pacific region feared the reintroduction of Cold War–style alliance structures. While studying in the United States in 2005, Professor Richard Armitage, former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, told us that despite the analytical capabilities of the United States, their projections did not extend beyond 2025. According to them, the U.S. would remain a superpower, but only one of several, and the world would have a different structure. These are simple examples – but they describe the world we are living in today.
And how do you personally view current events?
As I have described many times in my work and lectures, experience from large-scale complex crises over the past quarter-century has shown that no state or group of states, even with the mandate of an international organization, has the ability to impose its will by force on another nation or culture at this stage of human development. At the same time, earlier assumptions by proponents of globalization – that people in crises primarily make decisions based on microeconomic cost-benefit analysis – have not been confirmed. This is where modern military interventions have failed. On the contrary, we now see that core values shaped by culture and history are stronger than imported ideas. Culture, in combination with the state, remains a powerful force, particularly at the boundaries of different civilizations. This is one of the key factors in strategic thinking and in defining a country’s geopolitical orientation. It may not sound optimistic, but we must accept it as reality. Fifteen years ago, I made several notes while preparing for senior strategic command, and I still rely on them. They show that the principles on which our societies are built may not be universally accepted as a basis for solidarity in a global context. Nor may there be agreement on any shared set of principles in a multicultural environment. Most importantly, future challenges may outweigh the values that shaped the post-World War II world and the Cold War era. If we look at developments in Europe and globally over the past fifteen years, these reflections have proven quite accurate – and this context is essential for understanding conflicts in Ukraine and Western Asia.
What is the current state of our army?
Our army has made very significant progress over the past twenty-five years of professionalization. It is a modern force with highly competent personnel. It is undergoing one of the fastest modernization processes among NATO member states. In several areas, we belong – or are entering – an exclusive group of armed forces equipped with the most advanced technologies. These include passive surveillance systems, radar technology, electronic warfare, communication systems, chemical defense units, satellite communications, fifth-generation aircraft, Spyder air defense systems, and many others.
What is your top priority in the army right now?
People. That is why we have accelerated our efforts in human resource management. The window of opportunity for intensive recruitment lasts until 2030, after which we will face demographic decline. Already now, we have achieved 88 percent of our recruitment target for 2026. As I mentioned, force development is my field. I expected record recruitment this year, but the pace is truly remarkable. We will create the best possible conditions to meet citizens’ interest in serving – whether in the professional army, the active reserve, or voluntary training programs. At the same time, we are working to improve the quality of service and life for our soldiers. We are increasing salaries, developing new benefits, and launching modernization and construction of housing facilities. In the future, it will also be necessary to introduce systemic measures in recruitment and training within educational and training institutions to ensure that we can meet our long-term strategic goals through 2040.
2026 and the army
Financial resources are often discussed in relation to the army. What is the situation this year? “In 2026, 251 monitored acquisition projects and nearly 1,100 additional procurement cases will be implemented, with a total value of almost CZK 60 billion,” says Jaromír Zůna. “This year’s budget remains strongly investment-oriented. In 2025, total spending reached CZK 155 billion. For 2026, the defence sector has CZK 158 billion available, including unspent funds from previous years. Since 2014, defence spending has increased by 400 percent, representing one of the fastest growth rates within the Alliance. If we maintain this trend, the army will move significantly closer to its long-term objectives. And if these funds are used exclusively for defence, there will be no need to significantly increase spending beyond two percent of GDP. Our economy is growing, which also raises the statutory two-percent level of defence spending.”
CV BOX
Jaromír Zůna (born November 26, 1960, in Přílepy) is Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister.
He graduated from the Military Academy of Ground Forces in Vyškov, studied International Relations and European Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague, and pursued doctoral studies at the University of Defence in Brno. He also completed programs at the U.S. Joint Forces Staff College, National War College, National Defense University, Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army Infantry School.
From 1984, he served eleven years with the military in Vyškov before joining the General Staff of the Czech Armed Forces. In the late 1990s, he served as deputy commander of the 6th Mechanized Battalion in IFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2013, he became deputy commander at the Joint Forces Training Center. From 2019 to 2022, he was First Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Until 2024, he served as Defence Attaché of the Czech Republic in China, Mongolia, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He has been Minister of Defence since mid-December 2025.
He is married and has two sons, Jaromír and Ondřej. He speaks English, Arabic, Russian, and French.
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